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Remote attestation schemes have been utilized for assuring the integrity of a network node to
a remote verifier. In recent years, a number of remote attestation schemes have been proposed
for various contexts such as cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoTs) and critical network
infrastructures. These attestation schemes provide a different perspective in terms of security
objectives, scalability and efficiency. In this report, we focus on remote attestation schemes that
use a hardware device and cryptographic primitives to assist with the attestation of nodes in a
network infrastructure. We also point towards the open research challenges that await the research
community and propose possible avenues of addressing these challenges.
1 INTRODUCTION
Network Infrastructures (NIs) exist in companies, industry and critical infrastructure sectors.
In the context of companies, the network infrastructure is considered as the backbone of
the operation and offering services to customers. For instance, in cloud computing used by
many of today’s companies, cloud network infrastructures provide the base service model
to realize cloud services. Another area where we can find network infrastructures is in any
of the 16 critical infrastructures sectors [35] such as energy and financial services. Both
application areas of network infrastructures depend on the integrity of their nodes to provide
a trustworthy service to clients.
Compromising the integrity of nodes in a network infrastructure such as virtual network
devices in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds [8] or even sensor nodes in an energy
smart grid [40, 67] can have tremendous effect in the trustworthiness of these systems.
Attacks performed in these network infrastructures [26] can have a devastating effect, which
can affect industry and society [34].
Current network infrastructures in cloud computing and critical infrastructure systems
have a large number of nodes which makes attestation not feasible when attesting only one
node at a time. Remote attestation schemes traditionally focus on attesting the integrity of
a single node and providing evidence for its current state to a remote verifier. There are
proposals that attempt to tackle the issue of attesting more than one node especially in the
realm of wireless sensor networks [70].
The security objectives and assumptions in these remote attestation schemes are different
where a number of attestation schemes provide protection from software-based attacks
and/or physical attacks. Other attestation schemes protect from Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks [11].
Our contribution: In this paper, we offer an overview on the current state of the art
regarding hardware-based architectures for attestation and their related attestation schemes
in network infrastructures that use cryptography. We focus on attestation schemes that rely
on hardware to prove that the software of a network node was not tampered with. In addition,
we review attestation schemes that depend on cryptographic primitives and protocols to
prove that the network node is in a legitimate state. Architectures and attestation schemes
that do not meet these criteria are not included in this paper.
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Table 1. Notation Summary
Term Description
V Verifier
P Prover
nV Challenge nonce from V
σ Signature of attestation
s Internal state
k Security parameter
S Sign operation
H Hash operation
1.1 Outline
In section 2 we discuss background information regarding network infrastructures and
remote attestation. Section 3 provides an overview of the main hardware based architectures
that can realize remote attestation schemes. Section 4 continues with a discussion on the
hardware-based attestation schemes. Section 5 focuses on the remote attestation schemes
that are categorized as hybrid attestation schemes. Section 6 discusses the open research
problems and possible ways of resolving them.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Network Infrastructures
Network Infrastructures (NI) provide the telecommunication backbone for a variety of
contexts such as cloud computing, enterprise networks and critical infrastructures. NIs
consist of a connected group of computer systems linked with a number of network hardware
components. As seen in Figure 1 the main hardware components are routers, wireless access
points, switches and firewalls. Each hardware component employs a software layer that
is managed by network administrators. The software layer can be as simple as firmware
used in routers or switches to full blown operating systems to manage cloud infrastructure
networking.
NIs are categorized as either open or closed. Open NIs means that the infrastructure
employs an open architecture such as the Internet. In a closed NI the network is confined to
a certain boundaries. For instance, an enterprise intranet is considered a closed NI. Another
categorization of NIs is the method the nodes in the network use to communicate with their
peers. The nodes in the network can either communicate via wired network connection or a
wireless one or even a combination of the two methods.
In recent years there has been many research works regarding NIs to create higher-level
abstractions. One method is to decouple the network functions from network devices using
virtualization, which is called network function virtualization (NFV) [61]. For instance a
network function such as a firewall can be deployed as virtual network function in software
which enhances its programmability. Another method is by using Software Defined Networking
(SDN) [55]. SDN separates the network control from the actual network devices. This means
that the network control becomes programmable via open interfaces such as OpenFlow [56].
In this setting the network devices become forwarding devices and a centralized controller
implements the control logic.
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Fig. 1. Network infrastructures deployed in various contexts such as cloud computing, enterprise networks,
mobile networks and backbone networks
As we have seen so far there is a variety of technologies that are created on top of NIs.
Even though the network devices are used in a different way depending on which method is
selected, we still require that the devices are protected from malicious users. This can be
achieved by using remote attestation schemes for NIs to ensure that nodes are authenticated
and have not been compromised by a malicious user.
2.2 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation is a mechanism that enables a remote verifier to ascertain the integrity
of a host that it is in a known state. This mechanism follows a challenge-response protocol
and the main entities in this protocol are the Prover(P) and the Verifier(V ). The goal of
an honest, non-compromised prover is to construct a response such that it can convince a
Verifier that the prover is in an acceptable state for the time the attestation was requested.
There are three main types of remote attestation according to the taxonomy by Steiner
and Lupu [70]:
(1) software-based attestation where the attestation mechanism relies on strict time mea-
surements to convince a verifier that the prover is in a legitimate state.
(2) hardware-based attestation where a tamper-resistant hardware component is used to
execute the attestation routines in a secure environment.
(3) hybrid attestation where the attestation method uses hardware/software co-design
to offer attestation services but does not require complex hardware components. In
hybrid attestation the main requirements are minimal hardware components such as
Read Only Memory (ROM) and a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) that a device with
limited capabilities can include in its design.
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of state-of-the-art hardware approaches for remote attestation
In this study, we aim to review the state-of-the-art remote attestation approaches that are
either based on hardware components or they offer a software/hardware co-design architecture
that realizes the attestation scheme. In addition, we focus on remote attestation schemes that
utilize cryptographic primitives as part of their attestation protocol. We further categorize
the remote attestation schemes in terms of the number of attesting nodes in a network
infrastructure. The first category attests one node each time while the second category
the attestation happens in groups of nodes. Strong security is of paramount importance in
today’s environment where attackers are able to launch attacks to network infrastructures.
Therefore, cryptography can be used in a way that benefits the attestation of nodes in a
network infrastructure.
Figure 2 depicts the taxonomy of the hardware approaches for remote attestation in
network infrastructures. We structure this report around the taxonomy and discuss each
category for the remote attestation schemes. In addition we compare the research works
in each category in terms of how the attestation works in network infrastructures and the
number of attested nodes the method supports. The cryptographic primitives used in each
attestation research works are compared and discuss the reasoning for adding them to each
attestation scheme.
We acknowledge previous works in remote attestation that provide a generic protocol view
for attestation schemes [6, 36, 38, 41, 58] and we adopt that the attestation involves three
main stages: (1) Challenge, (2) Attest and (3) Verify.
Figure 3 illustrates a concise overview of a generic remote attestation protocol that uses
cryptography. The attestation protocol is similar to the ones in [36, 38, 41]. In this generic
protocol view of remote attestation we assume that both the Verifier and the Prover have
generated key pairs according to a parameter k. The Prover initiates the protocol by sending
a message to the Verifier requesting for an attestation to be performed in her platform.
Then the Verifier responds by first generating a nonce that is used a challenge nonce and
sending the nonce back to the Prover. The Prover upon receiving the challenge nonce fro the
Verifier then she performs the attestation process Attest and generating the appropriate
attestation data as evidence for the Verifier to prove. For instance, in the TPM one might
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Generic Remote Attestation Protocol
Verifier: V Prover: P
RequestAttest(P)
nV ∈R {0, 1}k
nV
att data := Attest(S)
σ := Siдn(att data,nV )
σ
AuthProver (P)
Veri f y(k,σ , P)
Fig. 3. Generic Remote Attestation Protocol. In this protocol we assume that the verifier and prover
have generated key pairs according to parameter k.
use as attestation evidence the current contents of the Platform Configuration Registers
(PCRs) which demonstrate the current state of the platform. After the attestation data has
been collected then the Prover signs the attestation data and the challenge nonce using a
signature scheme. The signature σ is then communicated to the Verifier. In this instance,
the Verifier is starting the authentication process AuthProver(P) to authenticate that the
Verifier is talking to the right Prover. The next step in the remote attestation protocol is
to verify the signature received from the Prover using the Verify(k,σ,P) process. The
outcome of the verification process is either true or false.
3 HARDWARE-BASED ARCHITECTURES FOR REMOTE ATTESTATION
In this section, we review the main architectures based on hardware device or component for
realizing remote attestation schemes. Table 2 provides an overview of all the architectures
that are used for realizing remote attestation schemes.
3.1 TPM
One of the most prevalent examples of a discrete tamper-resistant hardware component
for remote attestation is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This device is added in
motherboards as a way to provide trusted computing facilities to the platform. Currently
there are two versions of the TPM. The first version of the TPM v1.2 [45] is based on RSA
cryptography and the second version TPM v2.0 is based on elliptic curve cryptography [13,
69].
The TPM works as coprocessor and is able to store keys and realize remote attestation.
The Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) in the TPM hold hashes of code or data
that are used in remote attestation. The published specification for TPM v1.2 outlines the
functionality and cryptographic primitives that are required for the hardware component.
Generating random data in a TPM is supported using a Randomness Number Generator
0:6 Sfyrakis and Groß
Table 2. Overview of main hardware-based architectures that support attestation schemes
Architecture Approach Features Advantages Disadvantages
Cryptography
Support
Theoretical
Results
Examples
TPM [45, 69] co-processor
Secure key storage,
Secure memory,
Data sealing,
Attest software configurations,
Bind keys to TPM device
Attestation algorithms in HW,
Algorithmic agility (v2.0),
Support privacy-preserving
attestation
Req. high-power HW,
Low scalability,
Complex privacy-preserving
protocols
RSA, ECC,
HMAC
DAA,
Privacy-CA
[13, 33, 71]
SGX [5, 50, 59]
Special CPU
instructions
Protected software in enclave,
Sealing
Local/Remote attestation,
Support privacy-preserving
attestation
Req. specific CPUs,
Closed ecosystem for
attestation services
ECC, CMAC EPID [27, 72]
SMART [39, 41]
HW/SW
co-design
Read-only verification code,
Secure key storage,
Attestation ROM
Atomic execution
Minimal HW changes,
Supports low-power
devices
Static attestation
key/code,
One attestation instance,
Limited crypto support
HMAC None
[23, 48]
[25, 47]
TrustLite [52]
HW/SW
co-design
Execution-Aware Memory
Protection Unit,
Local attestation
between trustlets,
Secure Loader,
Trusted communication
between trustlets
Minimal HW changes,
Updateable attestation code
and security policies,
Support low-power devices
Support only
local attestation,
Bespoke OS,
Limited crypto support,
Static software configuration
Cryptographic
Hash
None [3, 47, 48]
Tytan [10]
HW/SW
co-design
Hardware-assisted dynamic
root of trust,
Secure IPC,
Local/remote attestation,
Secure boot, Platform key
Support low-power devices,
Dynamic configuration
of access control rules,
Local attestation of
multiple trustlets
Update tasks at runtime,
Limited crypto support
Cryptographic
Hash
None [1]
Sanctum [37]
HW/SW
co-design
Security monitor for enclaves,
Local attestation
Minimal/minimal invasive
HW changes,
Support low-power devices,
Attestation chain of trust
Req. bespoke SW,
Synchronous attestation
Relies on signing
enclave for attestation
Cryptographic
Hash,
Symmetric ‘encryption,
RSA
None [57]
(RNG). The main cryptographic primitive that is supported is RSA key generation and
signature schemes. For calculating the hashes the TPM uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm,
which is now considered vulnerable to attacks. The first key enclosed in the TPM is the
Endorsement Key (EK) and is generated during the manufacturing process. This key is used
in almost all key related operations in the TPM. Other keys that can be generated are the
Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) used in digital signature operations and the storage keys
used in encryption and decryption of data.
The first approach for supporting remote attestation in TPM v1.2 used a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) called Privacy-CA [33] that raised privacy concerns. Another remote attestation
scheme was added that provides privacy-preserving remote attestation based on a group
signature scheme [13] based on RSA called Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).
The TPM specification was updated to version 2.0 [46] provides a number of new features
for the trusted hardware component. First, the TPM v2.0 supports a larger variety of cryp-
tographic algorithms, and especially for privacy-preserving attestation the implementation is
less rigid giving room for realizing different flavors of DAA-like schemes. Second, this version
of the TPM supports multiple banks of PCRs and three key hierarchies.
One of the main disadvantages of using TPMs in network infrastructures is that they
support high-power hardware. They are used in hardware platforms that have enough
processing power to assist with the computation of attestation schemes. Another disadvantage
that exists in TPMs is that they privacy-preserving attestation schemes are considered
complex and they are difficult to deploy in large network infrastructures.
3.2 Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [59] is a trusted execution environment that was
first announced in 2013 and supports both local and remote attestation. Applications can
support Intel SGX by partitioning the application in two parts the untrusted and trusted
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part. We create an enclave with the trusted part of the application. Intel SGX assures the
confidentiality and integrity of code and data that reside in an enclave. In addition, there
is no other software such as OS or a hypervisor that can access the memory region that
the enclave resides. The enclave pages reside in a memory region called Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM). This region includes two structures for the enclaves, the Enclave Page
Cache (EPC) and Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). The EPC store the code and data of
the enclave while the EPCM holds state information for the enclave.
Untrusted software create and initialize the enclave and the hardware assures that the
enclave can only be modified before it is initialized. During the initialization phase all the
contents of the enclave such as its code and data are measured and this measurement can
become the basis for future local and remote attestations.
One feature of Intel SGX is that an enclave can attest to another that it has been loaded
correctly by producing a report which includes information about the author of the enclave
or the enclave measurement. This process consists the method for local attestation. Intel
SGX uses a specific enclave called quoting enclave that wraps the report into a quote. More
precisely the quote is signed using an asymmetric attestation key. This process is part of the
Enhanced Privacy Identifier (EPID) [17] signature scheme provided by Intel, which is an
extension of the DAA scheme used in TPMs. A remote verifier can then receive the quote
and start the verification process with a corresponding verification key that is provided by
Intel.
The attestation in Intel SGX requires specific CPUs and provides a closed ecosystem
for realizing attestation schemes that are totally controlled by Intel. There are efforts that
attempt to create third party attestation services [68] using Intel SGX but it is still required
to use an Intel provided enclave named Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE) that acts
as a local certificate authority.
3.3 SMART
SMART [39] is a reference hardware architecture that supports attestation in low-powered
devices. The main features of this architecture is that it includes immutable attestation code
stored in a Read-only Memory (ROM) that guarantees that the code is not changed after it
is placed there. In addition, SMART supports secure key storage and atomic execution of
operations.
The design principles behind this architecture propose that changes to hardware compo-
nents and interfaces should be kept to a minimum. As the attestation code is immutable
SMART architecture can support only one attestation scheme instance.
3.4 TrustLite
The TrustLite [52] hardware architecture is a flexible and efficient software isolation platform
for low-powered devices. This architecture introduces trustlets, which are trusted tasks
developed to realize an application. The goal of trustlets is to isolate the enclosed software
components and protect the confidentiality and integrity of their code and data. The memory
protection scheme in this architecture involves the Execution-Aware Memory Protection Unit
(EA-MPU). The EA-MPU can be programmed in software and offers a flexible allocation
of memory across memory and I/O components. Another feature of the architecture is the
Secure Loader, which loads the selected trustlets alongside their data into memory. Another
goal of the Secure Loader is to program the Memory Protection Unit (MPU) to protect its
own code and the memory regions of all trustlets. The Secure Loader also start the chain of
trust process for remote attestation.
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One of the advantages of this architecture is that it enables the local attestation be-
tween multiple trustlets. Trusted communication between trustlets happens using a simple
handshake protocol between a Trustlet A and Trustlet B. Trustlet A is the initiator that
verifies the platform configuration and the security policy of the MPU for Trustlet B who
is the responder. The initiator can also verify the cryptographic hash of the responder’s
internal state so that it can be assured that is not modified. Then the responder can also
perform a local attestation on the initiator using the same attestation process as the initiator.
A cryptographic hash over the identifiers of the trustlets and their corresponding nonces
comprise the cryptographic session token. The token can be used to authenticate bidirectional
messages between the two trustlets.
Another advantage of TrustLite is that its security extensions do not depend on the CPU
instruction set and can be adjusted using software. Thus all the related software such as the
Secure Loader and security policies can be updated. This is in contrast with the SMART
architecture where the attestation code and key are not updateable.
One of the main disadvantages of this security architecture is that it only support the
local attestation of trustlets that remain on the same system. Another disadvantage is that
TrustLite requires a custom built software in order to support the memory protection scheme
and the user tasks. In terms of cryptography support it only uses a cryptographic hash
for the attestation process. Of course the architecture could be extended with additional
cryptographic components such as cryptographic accelerators. The default configuration is to
just enable a cryptographic hash for measuring the state of a trustlet. In addition, the static
software configuration does not enable to change the software configuration dynamically
during runtime.
3.5 Tytan
Tytan [10] is a hardware security architecture for low-powered devices. The system archi-
tecture of Tytan consists of ten different components. Tasks represent the applications in
embedded systems and there are two types of tasks. The first type is the normal tasks that
are isolated from other tasks but not from the OS. The second type is the secure tasks that
are isolated from all the other software. In addition, each task has a unique identifier.
The Execution-aware Memory Protection Unit (EA-MPU) hardware component enforces
memory access control and makes sure that each task can only access the memory it has
been allocated. The hardware component is also coupled with a driver that enables the
dynamic handling of tasks and the loading or unloading of a secure task. Tytan is assigned
a platform key that the EA-MPU enforces the access to the key.
Tytan architecture includes a real time OS to provide a real-time scheduling. The main
features of this architecture include the strong isolation of dynamically configured software
components using dynamic root of trust and real time guarantees. Another feature of Tytan
is the local and remote attestation. Tytan also supports secure inter-process communication
(IPC) between two parties using authentication.
Attestation in Tytan is realized by executing the Root of Trust of Measurement (RTM)
task. This task is executed to prove the integrity of a either a local or a remote by computing a
cryptographic hash over the binary code of each attested task. In order to prove authenticity to
a local verifier the task identifier is used. For remote attestation the a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) is computed alongside an attestation key.
In terms of disadvantages this architecture does not support the updating of tasks during
runtime and only supports a cryptographic hash method for the attestation process.
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3.6 Sanctum
Sanctum [37, 57] is an architecture that depends on minimal and minimal invasive changes to
the hardware. It uses a trusted software component called security monitor to yield security
properties similar to Intel SGX. The architecture relies on a hardware/software co-design to
isolate and protect the integrity of applications. The authors make slight adjustments to well
understood building blocks and mechanisms. The CPU building blocks do not require any
adjustments as Sanctum only makes changes to the interfaces of these building blocks. Thus,
the integration of Sanctum to other hardware platforms is easier to achieve in comparison
to Intel SGX which requires specific CPUs in order to function.
Sanctum relies on a select set of trusted software components to drive similar security
mechanisms with those in Intel SGX. For instance both systems support a method to locally
attest the integrity of software. Sanctum provides an open-source implementation of the
security monitor which is portable to different CPU architectures and amenable to rigorous
security analysis. In contrast, the Intel SGX relies on microcode which its source code is not
openly available and is specific to the CPU models.
The trusted software components replace the microcode that Intel SGX uses. There are
three software components that are part of the Sanctum architecture. The first component is
the measurement root that is burned in an on-chip ROM. The goal of the measurement root is
to execute successfully three tasks: compute a cryptographic hash from the security monitor
which is added as input to both generate a monitor attestation key pair and attestation
certificate.
The second component is the security monitor which takes over when the measurement
root has managed to construct the attestation measurement chain. The security monitor
offers an API that focuses on managing enclaves and allocating memory regions. The API
can be invoked both from the OS and the enclaves. Timing attacks can deployed in such
a setting for the API. For this reason the security monitor is prohibited from accessing
any enclave data and from accessing any memory regions related to the attestation key.
In addition, the security monitor is not allowed to perform any cryptographic operations
that use attestation keys. Thus, computing attestation signatures is deferred to the signing
enclave.
The third component is the signing enclave which executes the signing algorithm. The
reasoning behind this design decision is to avoid any timing attacks and remove the de-
pendency on the security monitor to compute the signatures for attestation. The signing
enclave is executed inside the security monitor as an enclave isolated from other software.
The security monitor evaluates any calls to the signing enclave by checking the known
measurement of the signing enclave. If the call is successfully evaluated, then it proceeds
to the singing enclave. For instance, the first call that the signing enclave receives is the
monitor’s private attestation key which is then copied to the enclave’s memory. The signing
enclave can authenticate another enclave and uses a mechanism similar to the Intel SGX’s
reporting mechanism called mailbox.
Mailboxes are part of the enclave’s metadata and are specified during construction. This
is a synchronous messaging mechanism that requires both sending and receiving enclave
to run simultaneously and exist in memory so that they can communicate. The receiving
enclave uses an API call that includes the mailbox that will receive the message and the
sending enclave’s identity. The sending enclave which want to be authenticated sends an
API call to the receiving enclave with the identity of the receiving enclave and the mailbox
inside the receiving enclave. Then the receiving enclave issues a read API call to request
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the contents of the message to be moved from the mailbox to the enclave’s memory. The
receiving enclave is assured of the sending enclave’s identity when the API call to read is
successful.
4 HARDWARE-BASED ATTESTATION
In this section we focus on the attestation methods that use a tamper-resistant hardware
component to drive the attestation process. We separate the methods used in two categories
depending on if the methods support attesting only one node each time or a group of
nodes. We also discuss two variations of the hardware-based approach. First, a discrete
tamper-resistant hardware component embedded in a motherboard provides the required
attestation services such as generating and storing cryptographic keys, signing attested data.
Second, there are co-processor hardware components that assist the attestation process and
collaborate with other hardware components.
4.1 Single Platform Attestation
In this subsection, we focus on approaches that attest one node at a time in a network
infrastructure.
4.1.1 Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Attesting the integrity of a single platform is the
focus of most attestation schemes developed during the last 20 years of research. It is a popular
problem domain, which has been thoroughly researched and especially for trusted computing.
In the following paragraphs we discuss the main schemes that have been developed.
The protocol in the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for the TPM v1.2 is
based on the third party Privacy Certificate Authority (CA) [44] to complete the attestation
of the platform identify. When a user purchases a trusted computing platform it does not have
an identity. In order for the platform to gain an identity the TPM owner requests a certificate
from a trusted third-party Privacy CA. The output of this process is the Attestation Identity
Key (AIK) certificate that the platform can use to attest the integrity of the platform. The
main disadvantage of this process is that the Privacy CA knows the identity of the platform.
If the verifier colludes with the Privacy CA then the integrity of the platform cannot be
assured. Another disadvantage of this approach is that the Privacy-CA is a single point of
failure and it can become a performance bottleneck if the verifier queries the Privacy-CA for
each verification request. Paired dictate this is very good approach regarding this at the
station skin skin scheme. The next idea that is included in this report discusses the main
aspects off the security and privacy issues what are eyes doing the execution off the other
stations game receipt
4.1.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation. The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [13] scheme
uses zero-knowledge proofs and CL-signatures to enable the attestation of a platform without
compromising the identity of the platform. The DAA scheme includes three entities: platform,
issuer and verifier. The role of the issuer is to generate and issue credentials to platforms and
consult a revocation list to revoke platforms that are considered compromised. The platform
entity in the DAA scheme consists of a host computer and a TPM device. Both components
in the platform contribute to create signatures that prove to a verifier that the platform
which created the signature was indeed issued a credential by the issuer. As a result the
verifier checks the proofs and is not able to identify the platform that created the signature.
The initial version proposed is based on RSA and is considered inefficient and forms part
of the TCG specification for TPM v1.2. Subsequent works extend the DAA scheme and use
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and bilinear maps [14] to further improve efficiency of
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Table 3. Security properties of DAA schemes.
DAA scheme
Security
Unforgeability Revocation Anonymity Unlinkability Attributes Assumptions Model
BCC04 [13]     # SRSA, DDH RO
C06 [20]  #   # SRSA, DDH RO
HS07 [43]      SRSA RO
BL07 [17]     # SRSA, DDH RO
BCL08 [15]  #   # LRSW, DBDH RO
XD08 [74]  #   # q-SDH, DDH RO
BCL09 [16]  #   # LRSW, DBDH RO
BL10a [12]     # SDH, DDH RO
BL10b [18]  #   # SDH, DDH RO
C10a [28]  #   # q-SDH, DDH RO
C10b [29]  #   # SDH, DDH RO
CPS10 [31]  #   # SDH, DDH RO
BFG13 [9]     # B-LRSW, DDH, CDH RO
CU15 [32]  #    LRSW, q-SDH RO
CDL16a [22]  #   # LRSW, DDH UC
CDL16b [21]      q-SDH UC
CCD17 [19]      q-SDH, LRSW UC
YCZ18 [75]      DDH, DBDH, q-SDH UC
KCB19 [51]  #   # Ring-ISIS, Ring-LWE Standard
Note:  : security property supported G#: security property partially supported #: security property not supported
the scheme. This scheme includes three main entities: issuer, prover and verifier. DAA uses
group signatures and zero-knowledge proofs to attest that the remote attestation originates
from an authentic TPM without disclosing to the verifier the exact identity of the TPM.
The issuer in DAA is provided with an anonymous credential instead of an identity for the
TPM. Then the TPM proves its identity to the verifier using zero-knowledge proofs and its
pseudonym.
There has been a large body of research over the DAA scheme with improvements suggested
and new schemes developed that aim to improve the efficiency of the scheme or integrate
DAA in other platforms such as ARM TrustZone. In addition, there is research that manage
to extend DAA scheme to encode attributes which can bind multiple TPMs to an anonymous
credential. A recent research thread for direct anonymous attestation is to leverage lattices
for creating DAA schemes [51] that are post-quantum safe.
4.1.3 Binary remote attestation. is used to attest the platform integrity. In this scheme the
TPM signs the PCR values representing the integrity of the platform. The TPM subsequently
sends the TPM signature and the measurement log to the remote verifier. Then the remote
verifier is able to attest the current state of the platform. Realization of this scheme is the
IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [66] and the trusted linux client (TLC)
system [65]. One of the disadvantages of this scheme is that it discloses the software and
hardware configuration of the platform to the remote verifier, which makes the platform
vulnerable to malicious attacks. In addition, there is a great variety of software and their
configurations and when the system needs to be updated it makes it difficult to evaluate the
configuration integrity of the platform.
4.1.4 Property-based Attestation (PBA). Another scheme used for remote attestation that
attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the binary remote attestation is the Property-based
Attestation (PBA) [30, 64] scheme. In this scheme the platform configurations are mapped to
properties which are attested in order to avoid the disclosure of the platform configurations.
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4.1.5 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Another type of hardware component to be
used in remote attestation schemes is the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [54, 63].
The PUF is a hardware-based security primitive first introduced by Gassend et.al. [42] The
authors propose that architecting the construction of the hardware component in a secure
way it can protect the attestation process and provide a secure basis for the attestation
computations.
5 HYBRID ATTESTATION
This attestation method includes a hardware component for the attestation process, but
also integrates with the software each network node uses. A type of hybrid attestation that
is related to our research area is swarm attestation or collective attestation [7, 23, 60, 62].
The main premise of this hybrid attestation method is the ability to attest a large number
of nodes across a network with various interaction patterns. The main focus is to offer
attestation services to remote embedded devices that have limited processing power. Even
though collective attestation schemes focus on embedded devices and devices with limited
processing power they still have a hardware component that they can rely on to fulfill or
assist with the attestation process.
5.1 Multiple Platform Attestation
Swarm attestation or collective attestation [2, 7, 23, 48, 49, 53, 73] focuses on remote
attestation of multiple platforms at a large scale. This type of attestation is considered a
hybrid attestation scheme since it utilizes a software/hardware co-design since the computing
platforms are embedded devices with limited capabilities and processing power. In this
context a TPM component could not be added to the device. If a TPM component was
added to a small embedded device, it would increase production costs and the price of the
device.
Collective attestation works by distributing the attestation process across all devices in a
network. A spanning tree is created during attestation over the network topology. The root
of the spanning tree is the verifier who also initiates the attestation. During the process of
the attestation each device validates their child devices and propagate in the spanning tree
an aggregate attestation report to their parent devices.
The first research work to propose a collective attestation scheme was Scalable Embedded
Device Attestation (SEDA) [7]. This attestation scheme works by using groups of many
provers. SEDA includes an off-line phase where an operator OP initializes the devices in the
swarm with a particular software configuration and certificate and an online phase for the
attestation process. This attestation scheme requires devices which includes minimal security
features and without any complex security hardware such as a TPM. A central verifier V
generates attestation requests that are propagated to all nodes of the network topology using
a flooding protocol as seen in Figure 4. Then the verifier accepts the aggregate attestation
reports of the devices in the network.
The Secure Collective Attestation Scheme (SANA) [2] is a collective attestation scheme
for dynamic embedded devices network that employs signature scheme called Optimistic
Aggregate Signature scheme (OAS). This scheme integrates aggregate and multi-signatures
in which n signers sign messages m1, . . . ,mn . The majority of the signers sign the default
message M. Each signature is aggregated into an aggregate signature, which is shorter than
signing n different signatures. The main parties of this attestation scheme are: prover (P),
aggregator (A), owner (O) and verifier (V ). A prover Pi constructs the proof of integrity of its
software configuration to be sent to the verifier. An aggregator Ai relays the messages between
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Fig. 4. SEDA collective attestation in a swarm of 8 devices [7]
different parties, collects and aggregates the responses from other provers or aggregators.
The network owner O is responsible to deploy and maintain the embedded devices that act
as provers. A remote verifier V is assured of the software integrity of all provers that are
part of the network during the attestation process. SANA also considers the possibility of
compromised devices, which do not affect the integrity of the attestation process.
SeED [48] is another attestation scheme for multiple embedded devices which introduces
a non-interactive attestation protocol. The attestation process is executed at random times
which is known between the verifier and prover. This way the messages exchanged between an
V and P are kept to a minimum. The P creates an attestation response which is sent to the V .
The V accepts the response only if it is inside the time period for this attestation execution.
If that is true then the V checks for authenticity, freshness, and trustworthiness of software
measurements corresponding to an accepted software state. This protocol mitigates Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks while exhibiting low communication overhead and low network
congestion.
Lightweight Swarm Attestation (LISA) [23] aims at investigating methods of attesting
a possibly mobile group of provers. A new metric is introduced called Quality of Swarm
Attestation (QoSA) that measures the information offered by different collective attestation
schemes. LISA provides two practical variations of the collective attestation scheme presented
in Figure 4. LISA’s main focus is the construction of the spanning tree. The first variation
includes a synchronous mechanism to aggregate the attestation reports. The second variation
uses an asynchronous protocol that forwards the attestation reports directly to the verifier
without any previous aggregation.
Device Attestation Resilient to Physical Attacks (DARPA) [49] is a collective attestation
scheme that can detect both software-based and physical attacks. The authors propose a
heartbeat protocol that is executed at regular time intervals. The heartbeat is propagated
throughout the network topology and it proves the presence of neighbouring devices that
are members in a network topology. This way an adversary that compromises a device can
be detected, under the premise that the adversary needs to take the device offline to attack
it. A verifier can then detect if any devices are missing when collecting the heartbeat logs.
In addition, this work is can be integrated with other collective attestation schemes such as
SEDA or LISA to protect the network topology from an adversary with physical access.
Secure and Lightweight Attestation of Highly Dynamic and Disruptive Networks (SALAD) [53]
is a collective attestation scheme for highly dynamic networks. The main difference of this
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scheme is that instead of creating a spanning tree of the network topology during attestation
with the root node being the verifier, the attestation process uses a distributed approach.
The idea is to have devices that communicating with other nearby devices to attest the
software integrity of each other. Then they exchange the attestation proofs, which also
include accumulated attestation proofs of other nearby devices. SALAD protects against
DoS attacks when some of the devices prevent an attestation of other devices in the network.
In addition, the verifier can receive the attestation result from any participating device,
without the need to hold the communication with a particular network device.
Decentralized Attestation for Device Swarms (DADS) [73] is another scheme that proposes
a decentralized collective attestation scheme that is scalable to a large number of embedded
devices and supports high mobility networks with a dynamic topology. In this scheme each
member device in the network is attested by a device in its vicinity. Each attested device
is then assigned to verify other devices. Thus, there is only a need for a central verifier
during the initial stages of the attestation process and makes this scheme resilient to single
point failures. In addition, DADS offers a local attestation process where a node can locally
attest the software integrity of its modules. In case there are any compromised nodes DADS
provides a means of graph restructuring the network topology of the attested nodes.
Scalable Heterogeneous Layered Attestation (SHeLa) [62] is a collective attestation scheme
that adds an additional edge layer in between the root verifier and the swarm devices present
in the infrastructure network. The edge layer consists of the edge verifier and the swarm
nodes present in this layer, which take the role of the prover in this locality. This scheme uses
a distributed method of attestation where the verifier can obtain the attestation result from
any node in the swarm. Even though this solution is scalable, there are privacy concerns since
each edge verifier keeps a log of related information and the root verifier stores information
regarding all the layers of the infrastructure.
Practical Attestation for Highly Dynamic Swarm Topologies (PADS) [4] discusses a non-
interactive attestation scheme for dynamic and unstructured swarm networks. The main
feature of this scheme is the reduction of the collective attestation problem to a minimum
consensus problem. The provers attest themselves and add their attestation result into an
aggregate attestation by sharing their knowledge to adjacent provers that reside in the
swarm network.
Efficient Remote Attestation via Self-Measurement for Unattended Settings (ERAS-
MUS) [24, 25] is a remote attestation scheme that is based on the notion of self-measuring
the software code of provers in timed intervals and storing them locally. A verifier can request
the measurement history and discern if there is any mobile malicious code present that has
tampered with the measurements. The authors discuss the advantages of ERASMUS in
comparison with on-demand attestation and how this scheme can be used in the context of
collective attestation by integrating with an on-demand attestation scheme such as LISA.
ERASMUS can operate both according to a schedule and on-demand when receiving a query
from a verifier. The authors claim that ERASMUS is well suited for collective attestation
since it supports high mobility of the devices. Even though, this scheme minimizes the prover
computations it still uses LISA for the collective attestation inheriting the shortcomings of
the scheme.
In all above schemes, the main issue is that the verifiers learn about the structure of the
network topology that is being attested. However, there are cases where we would want
to keep the structure of the network confidential and provide other means of attesting the
nodes in a network. One such case is when a tenant verifier asks a cloud provider that
software integrity of her virtualized host is not compromised. The cloud provider would not
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Table 4. Comparison of collective attestation schemes focusing on security aspects
Scheme
Interaction Software Physical Attestation Cryptographic
Pattern Attacks Attacks Method Primitives
SEDA [7] 1 − N   Centralized ECDSA, SHA-1
SANA [2] 1 − N   Centralized Optimistic Aggregate
Signature
DARPA [49] 1 − N   Centralized MAC
SeED [48] 1 − N  # Centralized HMAC-DRBG
LISA [23] 1 − N  # Centralized ECDSA-256, SHA-256
SALAD [53] 1 − N   Distributed ECDH, SHA-256,
HMAC, EdDSA
DADS [73] M − N  # Decentralized ECDSA, HMAC
SHeLa [62] 1 − N  # Distributed SHA-256
PADS [4] 1 − N  # Distributed HMAC
ERASMUS [24, 25] 1 − N  # Centralized HMAC
 : supported feature G#: partially supported feature #: not supported feature
want to publicize the blueprint of her infrastructure. Therefore, we require to create novel
privacy-preserving attestation schemes that can scale to large networks and be resilient in
software and physical attacks.
6 OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
The current remote attestation solutions have issues that give room for improvement. In this
section, we discuss open research problems and provide avenues of further research in remote
attestation schemes. The main focus of this section is about the privacy and confidentiality
issues that arise when using remote attestation schemes and possible ways of addressing
those issues.
6.1 Privacy Issues
In hardware-based approaches discussed in this report exhibit a number of privacy issues
in terms of how the attestation is executed and the amount of information that that the
V learns about the structure of the network infrastructure that is attesting. An issue that
arises mainly when attesting nodes in a network is the information that the intermediary
nodes learn about the attestation result of adjacent nodes and how resilient is the attestation
scheme when the node attested is a malicious one and tries to add its own bogus information
to relay to other adjacent nodes in the network. In the attestation schemes that adjacent
nodes learn the attestation result of the previous nodes this can be an issue in terms of
relaying reliable information to the other nodes and finally the V will receive attestation
results that will not be correct in case that a malicious node injects its own attestation
results.
Therefore, a method to relay attestation results without the intermediary network nodes
to know is beneficial to improve the privacy of an attestation scheme. A number of ap-
proaches could be selected to achieve the required privacy level. One such approach involves
0:16 Sfyrakis and Groß
cryptographic primitives that are privacy-preserving and hide information from potential
adversaries.
Anonymous credential schemes provide a way to construct privacy-preserving attestation
schemes for nodes in a network. DAA is one of the most prevalent cryptographic scheme
based on anonymous credentials and group signatures. When we attest multiple platforms
in compound proof statements in a network infrastructure, a cryptographic scheme based on
anonymous credentials would be a step forward for protecting the privacy of intermediary
attestation results which include the software configuration of the device.
6.2 Confidentiality Issues
Apart from the privacy issues mentioned above there are a number of issues regarding the
confidentiality of attestation schemes in network infrastructures. In collective attestation
schemes a malicious prover that is adjacent to a number of other nodes in a network can
discover the structure of the network using the attestation results of other nodes that it is
collecting. In order to keep the structure of the network secret, there needs to be a method
of protecting the blueprint of the network without disclosing its structure. One way is to use
signature schemes and zero knowledge proof of knowledge protocols to convince adjacent
provers that the structure of the network is known but the actual structure is not disclosed
to other provers. Then the verifier can be assured that the structure of the network has been
protected. This method make sure that the verifier also does not get to know the structure
of the network from the attestation results collected from the network nodes.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Attesting network infrastructures is an important avenue for ensuring that nodes in a
network are in a legitimate state and are authenticated. There are a number of hardware
architectures that have been proposed to further support attestation schemes. A number of
these hardware architectures support higher-end hardware and cryptographic primitives for
attestation schemes, while other architectures exhibit a more minimal approach supporting
lower-end hardware and lightweight cryptographic primitives. We presented a categorization
of attestation schemes depending on the type of the attestation each research work used and
the cryptographic primitives employed to realize the schemes. This allowed us to compare and
contrast the attestation schemes that focus on different aspects on how to create attestation
schemes for network infrastructures. We also identified open research issues in terms of
confidentiality and privacy. Finally, we presented possible avenues of resolving the issues in
attestation schemes.
This paper shows that there are many works related to attestation architectures and
schemes. However, there is still room for improvement in terms of scalability, privacy and
confidentiality issues for attestation. We hope this survey acts as a starting point to future
research on attestation.
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